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Abstract 
While political scientists have become increasingly interested in the output of international 
courts, they have paid little attention to the manner by which these courts justify their decisions 
and develop legal norms. We address these issues through a network analysis of European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) citations. We argue that, like domestic review courts, the ECtHR uses 
its legal justifications at least in part to convince “lower” (domestic) courts of the legitimacy of 
its judgments. Several empirical observations are consistent with this view. First, country-
specific factors do not determine the case-law on which the Court relies. Instead, it cites 
precedent based on the legal issues in the case. Second, the Court is more careful to embed 
judgments in its existing case law with respect to the more politically sensitive decisions. Third, 
the court embeds its judgments in case-law more when the respondent government is from a 
common law legal system where the courts traditionally rely more on similar justifications. In 
all, we conclude that the ECtHR by and large uses case law to justify its decisions in a way that 
is similar to domestic review courts. Finally, we highlight the utility of applying network 
analysis to further study the development of international legal norms. 
 
 
 
Prepared for presentation at the 2010 Political Networks Conference.  Please 
do not cite or quote from this paper without the authors’ permission.  
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The Role of Precedent at the European Court of Human Rights: A Network Analysis of 
Case Citations 
How do international courts justify decisions with citations to their own case law? This 
question is interesting for at least two reasons. First, in ‘normal’ courts, judgments establish 
principles that the court and lower courts rely on when evaluating subsequent cases. International 
courts are delegated the authority to resolve specific disputes rather than to develop legal 
principles. There is no norm of stare decisis. Yet, international courts do de facto use precedent 
and their judgments have become a significant source of nonconsensual international law making 
(e.g., Helfer 2008). We know very little, however, about how the process of building on past case 
law works on these courts. Do theoretical and empirical findings from the study of how domestic 
courts use case law extend to the international arena or does the international character of the 
court also determine how the network of case law is constructed? Do international courts develop 
a network of case law that is blind to national differences, despite making judgments that apply 
to states with widely differing characteristics?  
Second, the manner by which international courts justify their decisions reveals 
something novel about how courts perceive the relationship with their external environment. 
Some argue that international courts tend to be unusually insulated from political pressures due 
to the multiple principals problem and the difficulty of legislative override. This allows these 
courts to behave like trustees who act according to professional legal norms rather than political 
prerogatives (e.g. Majone 2001, Alter 2008). Others, however, claim that international courts are 
highly susceptible to political pressures, mostly due to their uncertain compliance environment. 
Consequentially, these courts behave strategically in an effort to extent their authority while 
placating important domestic actors (Garrett and Weingast 1993; Garrett et al. 1998; Stephan 
2002; Carrubba et al. 2008). These debates have almost exclusively been about the willingness of 
international courts to adopt decisions against (powerful) states. Yet, the manner by which courts 
justify their decisions also sheds light on these issues. We propose a strategic legitimation model 
in which international judges construct case law based on the assumption that they are primarily 
communicating with other legal professionals who value legal consistency. Yet, international 
judges are motivated by concerns about non-compliance. As such, they exert more effort to 
embed decisions into authoritative precedent when pressures of non-compliance are high. 
We examine these issues on the most prolific international court: the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). Following recent analyses of citation patterns by the US Supreme Court 
(USSC), we apply network analysis to study the use of precedent (Fowler et al. 2007; Fowler and 
Jeon 2008; Bommarito et al. 2010).  Doing so allows us to assess general patterns in the way 
citations become connected to each other.  We focus on three patterns within the citations 
network.  First, we rely on the concept of centrality to measure the extent to which cases cite 
authoritative precedent.  By doing so, we can analyze which types of ECtHR opinions are more 
well-grounded in the Court's case law.  Second, we identify which cases have been most 
influential within the citations network, which allows us to examine whether there are systematic 
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reasons why some cases become more authoritative than others.  Third, we examine whether 
there are communities of jurisprudence within the overall network of ECtHR citations and 
whether membership in these communities is determined by national characteristics of the 
respondent governments or legal characteristics of the cases. 
Consistent with the strategic legitimation model, we find that the ECtHR exerts more 
effort to ground its decisions in authoritative precedent on politically sensitive cases.  Moreover, 
we find that the ECtHR uses more authoritative precedent when it decides cases from countries 
where domestic courts commonly use precedent in their judgments and thus the persuasive value 
of case law citation is highest. Yet, country-specific factors, such as legal culture, are irrelevant 
in determining the authority of precedent or the communities of precedent in the ECtHR’s case 
law network. Instead, these communities are determined by the legal substance of cases. This 
evidence is not consistent with a relativist perspective that the court uses different justifications 
for different (legal) cultures. It is also inconsistent with a view that citations purely serve an 
internal communication function or that the court is apolitical. In all, the evidence suggests that 
the ECtHR justifies its decisions like a ‘normal’ court. This is consistent with Voeten’s (2008) 
finding that ECtHR judges behave like ‘normal’ review judges in that their votes are influenced 
by ideology but not by the interests of their national governments or cultural differences.  
Aside from these insights, we offer descriptive and methodological contributions. Little is 
known about the development of legal norms on any international court. Part of our aim is to 
describe salient features of the ECtHR citation network, such as how the grounding of judgments 
in precedent has developed over time, and what are the most significant divisions between the 
Court's areas of jurisprudence.  We also describe the main communities of jurisprudence within 
the Court's corpus and explain the key differences between them. The ECtHR has issued more 
than 10,000 judgments and encompasses states with varying legal cultures and levels of 
development, including twenty states outside the European Union such as Russia and Turkey.1  
Like the USSC, the ECtHR allows individuals to challenge that a government act, practice or law 
is inconsistent with a supreme body of law: the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter: the Convention). USSC citations to 
ECtHR jurisprudence have caused controversy in the U.S. (Zaring 2006). Moreover, a growing 
debate exists on whether the ECtHR has become a de facto constitutional court that develops 
precedent in ways that are similar to the USSC (e.g., Stone Sweet 2009). For all these reasons, it 
is important to develop a better understanding of the ECtHR’s case law. 
The application of social network analysis to judicial citations is a relatively novel area of 
research, especially to courts outside the U.S.  Just as scholars learned a great deal from applying 
empirical spatial models of legislative voting (e.g., NOMINATE) to alternative institutional 
settings (Poole and Rosenthal 2001), we can learn much from extending the application of 
                                                 
1
 The 27 EU members and Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
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network analysis to a new institutional environment. While we are not the first to apply these 
methods to a citations network, ours is the first study that (a) applies these methods to an 
international court; (b) analyzes the relationship between case characteristics and a decision's 
importance in the precedent network; and (c) explains the substantive nature of the different 
communities in a legal citations network.  From a methodological perspective, our most notable 
finding is that the network of ECtHR citations is a scale-free network, like most citation 
networks (especially academic citations) but unlike the USSC citation network. We offer some 
testable hypotheses as to why these differences may occur. 
We proceed by first discussing the alternative models regarding the role that citations to 
precedent play in international courts. We then analyze the properties of the network of ECtHR 
citations, including by comparing them to those of the USSC, before turning to an analysis of the 
authority of precedent and communities within the ECtHR network. 
Theoretical Perspectives on the ECtHR’s Use of Precedent  
The role and usage of precedent on international courts is unclear. Most international 
tribunals are explicitly asked to limit their focus to the dispute at hand. For example, Article 59 
of the ICJ’s Statute proclaims that “The decision of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”2  Yet, the ICJ motivates its resolution 
of disputes with extensive references to its past opinions and considers these precedential 
(Shahabuddeen 2007). De facto norms of stare decisis also operate at the WTO (e.g. Busch 
2007). Similarly, although the ECtHR has to “confine its attention as far as possible to the issues 
raised by the concrete case before it,”3 it relies heavily on its past decisions, has no trepidations 
in referring to these decisions as “precedent,” and has developed an elaborate system to keep 
track of its case-law (Wildhaber 2000).  
The most obvious and direct purpose of citations is to develop an internally consistent 
body of law.  Citations help improve efficiency as they limit the degree to which previously 
resolved issues need to be revisited. Moreover, the persuasive force of precedent may help a 
collegial panel of judges reach consensus. These points are especially important as the ECtHR 
has an enormous backlog of cases (over 125,000 as of early 2010), many of the cases involve 
legal issues that have previously been addressed, and cases are decided by panels rather than all 
47 ECtHR judges.4 
Yet, citations may also serve a different purpose than internal communication. Most 
notably, the literature (especially on U.S. Courts) suggests that judges cite past cases to help 
legitimize their decisions to external audiences (e.g., Merryman 1954; Harris 1985; Tyler & 
Mitchell 1994; Hansford & Spriggs 2006, Hume 2006, Corley et al. 2005). Any court that resolves 
                                                 
2
 Although article 38 allows judiciary decisions to be a “subsidiary means.” 
3
 13 August 1981, Young, James and Webster vs. UK,   
4
 Most ECtHR judgments on the merit are reached by seven judge panels. Some cases are referred to the 
seventeen judge Grand Chamber. 
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a dispute between parties must tell the losing parties why they lost. In all modern societies, 
judges tell the loser: "You did not lose because we the judges chose that you should lose. You 
lost because the law required that you should lose" (Shapiro 1994).  Such justifications are 
essential to establish the perception that a tribunal is impartial. Demonstrating the consistency of 
a decision with past decisions may alleviate the losing party’s potential to claim that a decision 
was whimsical or motivated by non-legal considerations. 
Such considerations should be no less relevant on the ECtHR. For example, Alec Stone 
Sweet (2009, p.1) points out that: 
 “[..] judges in Strasbourg confront the same kinds of problems that their counterparts on national 
constitutional courts do; and they use similar techniques and methodologies to address these 
problems. [..T]he Court performs its most important governance functions through the building of a 
precedent-based jurisprudence. Through precedent, the Court seeks to legitimize its lawmaking, to 
structure the argumentation of applicants and defendant States, and to persuade States to comply 
with findings of violation. It does so in the name of “legal certainty and the orderly development of 
[its] case law.”  
If the purpose of citations is at least partially to persuade external actors, then there is 
much more to judges' choices of citation than a mechanical reliance on the most relevant 
precedents (Epstein & Knight 1998).  To start with, the choice of what precedent to cite should at 
least in partially depend on the characteristics of the audience at whom the decision is targeted. 
There is a multitude of potentially relevant audiences. Hume (2006, p. 824) writes that: 
"Justices who are concerned about legitimacy may have a number of different audiences 
in mind. They may wish to persuade fellow members of the Court to join their opinions 
or prevent others from defecting. They may want to influence the lower court judges who 
are responsible for interpreting their decisions or the administrators and other actors who 
are in charge of implementing them. Or they may wish to write opinions that are well-
regarded by the legal community, both now and in the future, thereby enhancing their 
reputations as jurists."  
 All these audiences are potentially important for the ECtHR, but domestic (“lower”) 
courts are especially crucial.  There is no supranational executive body that has coercive 
authority to enforce ECtHR judgments.5 The Court thus relies to a great extent on its abilities to 
persuade states and domestic courts to implement its rulings.  Executives may care about some 
citations. For example, Voeten (2010) suggests that the ECtHR’s reluctance to cite case law from 
outside the Council of Europe could be explained by fear that executives might use such citations 
to delegitimize ECtHR judgments.  Yet, generally judges and legal professionals are much more 
attuned to the details of legal opinions than are politicians.  We therefore suspect that the extent 
to which a case is motivated by precedent—and the types of precedent cited—may be especially 
important to domestic courts.  Like the ECJ (Weiler 1994), the ECtHR depends strongly on the 
                                                 
5
 The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers monitors the execution of judgments but does not have 
meaningful coercive authority, other than recommending that a member state be expelled from the Council. 
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willingness of domestic courts to implement its judgments. This is not only to ensure compliance 
with its immediate judgments but also to ensure that the legal principles it establishes have a 
broader effect. As the Court put it in 2003: 
“Although the primary purpose of the Convention system is to provide individual relief, its mission 
is also to determine issues on public-policy grounds in the common interest, thereby raising the 
general standards of protection of human rights and extending human rights jurisprudence 
throughout the community of Convention States.”6 
Cooperation from domestic courts is crucial for this. For example, if the ECtHR finds that 
the UK cannot deport a suspected terrorist to a country where he may be tortured (Chahal v. 
United Kingdom), this does not create a formal compliance obligation for Belgium or any other 
state in the Council of Europe nor does it formally command how the UK should act in new 
cases. The judgment does, of course, signal that the ECtHR would likely rule the same way if a 
similar case emerged, providing that countries believe that the ECtHR consistently applies case 
law. Yet, this is a long and arduous process as applicants need to exhaust domestic remedies 
before their ECtHR application is admissible. Moreover, this would (and does) strain the 
workload of the ECtHR with large numbers of cases in which the legal issues are essentially 
duplicative.  It would be much more desirable if the Belgian and UK courts would implement 
established ECtHR principles. Our suggestion is that the ECtHR’s use of precedent is at least 
partially aimed at persuading these courts to do so.  
We argue that the ECtHR strategically adjusts its citations to the characteristics of the 
case and the domestic courts it is communicating with. We start with two basic assumptions. 
First, ECtHR judges believe that the domestic judges they communicate with are more likely to 
be persuaded by decisions that are embedded in prior case law and are more likely to implement 
more persuasive judgments than less persuasive ones. Second, embedding decisions in relevant 
case law is costly as it requires effort on the behalf of ECtHR judges, an assumption shared by 
the literature on U.S. courts (e.g., Lax & Cameron 2007; Lupu & Fowler 2010).  If these 
assumptions hold, then the ECtHR should exert more effort in embedding decisions into previous 
case law when the benefits to persuading domestic judges are greater.  
An alternative perspective that has a divergent expectation in this regard is what we call a 
model of "relativist legitimation." Several legal scholars suggest that cultural relativist methods 
of legal interpretation have entered the ECtHR’s jurisprudence via the “margin of appreciation 
doctrine” (see the discussion in Sweeney 2005), which holds that each country has some latitude 
to resolve conflicts that arise between individual rights and the perceived national interests or 
values of that country (e.g., Yourow 1996). This doctrine was first explicitly stated in the 1976 
Handyside v. UK judgment in which the Court reasoned that: 
 
“It is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a uniform 
European conception of morals. The view taken by their respective laws of the 
                                                 
6
 ECtHR, judgment of 24 July 2003, Karner  v. Austria . 
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requirement of morals varies from time to time and from place to place which is 
characterized by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of opinion on the subject. …[This] 
leaves to the Contracting States a margin of appreciation.” 
 
These three theoretical perspectives—internal consistency, strategic legitimation and 
relativist legitimation—offer competing predictions regarding several dimensions of the pattern 
of the Court's citation practices.  First, while some of the Court's opinions cite a significant 
amount of case precedent, others cite a much smaller amount.  The internal consistency model 
would argue that this variation is largely based on the legal issues in the case.  Under this view, 
the variation in citations to precedent should be based on the number of cases on similar legal 
issues already in the system: the more cases there are, the easier it is for the court to embed its 
decisions in precedent.  
In one sense, the strategic legitimation perspective converges with the internal 
perspective on the basis by which judges select cases for citation. What Slaughter (2003) calls 
the “global community of courts” is “[…] forged more by their common function of resolving 
disputes under rules of law than by the differences in the law they apply and the parties before 
them” (p.  192). Thus, in order to be persuasive, ECtHR judges should choose the precedents 
they cite based on the legal issues in the case, not based on the characteristics of the country in 
question.   
Nonetheless, the strategic legitimation perspective offers three predictions that differ 
from the internal model, all of which are based on the notion that some domestic courts will need 
more convincing on some cases than on others and the extent to which this is so is at least 
somewhat predictable.  First, Harris (1985, pp. 209-10) argues that courts of last resort cite more 
authoritative precedent "the more difficult and uncertain the decision. … Legitimacy is always 
an intrinsically difficult achievement for courts, but some decisions require more legitimation, 
and thus more display of information, than others" (see also Hume 2006).  Cases such as Chahal, 
which invoke physical integrity rights, go to the heart of executive control over a society. On 
such cases, all domestic courts face some amount of political pressure to interpret the legal facts 
in a light more favorable to an executive.  For such cases, the Court should be particularly 
diligent in grounding its decision in authoritative precedents that demonstrate that similar norms 
have been applied elsewhere.  
Second, the Court should better embed its decisions into case law when it finds a violation 
against a government and when it rejects a preliminary objection by a government. Findings of 
no violation communicate meaningful information to domestic courts about the proper 
interpretation of the Convention. Yet, on such judgments domestic courts do not face pressure to 
go against the ECtHR’s finding and thus need less persuading to implement judgments. 
Preliminary objections are arguments filed by governments that a case should not be evaluated 
on the merit. In rejecting a preliminary objection, the ECtHR has to defend its jurisdiction and 
the applicability of the Convention on a legal issue. These are cases where a respondent 
government explicitly claims that the Convention does not apply but the ECtHR finds otherwise. 
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It is reasonable to expect that on such cases the pressures against implementation are strongest 
and so should be the demand for strong justification.  
Third, extensively motivating decisions with precedent may be a more important tool of 
persuasion when communicating with common law courts than with civil law courts.  Precedent-
based jurisprudence is relatively more important in the former legal system (Troper & 
Grzegorczyk 1997) and so may be more likely to persuade common law judges. This should give 
ECtHR judges additional incentives to justify their decisions with past case law.  These 
observable implications all diverge from a purely internal perspective in the sense that the latter 
perspective does not provide any reason to expect that the strength of justification should vary 
according to how politically sensitive the implementation of a judgment is or how receptive the 
audience is likely to be.  
The relativist legitimation perspective offers a competing prediction regarding the extent 
to which ECtHR decisions will be embedded in precedent.  Specifically, this approach predicts 
that the characteristics of the respondent country will be the primary determinants of this, rather 
than the legal issues.  Gerards (2008), for example, finds that the Court follows an individualized 
case-based approach to justifying its judgments, with different justifications for different 
circumstances.  In an influential book, Mitchell Lasser (2004) has argued that the perceived 
legitimacy of specific forms of legal reasoning depends crucially on cultural context. What he 
calls the “particular problematic" of legal justification “shapes (and is shaped by) the judicial 
system that addresses it, thereby conceptually creating and recreating that system’s particular 
argumentative, conceptual, and institutional universe" (p. 298).  For example, arguments used to 
justify findings of violations in the UK (and other common law countries) may not be 
particularly persuasive for domestic courts in civil law countries or in countries with lower 
human rights standards, such as Turkey.   
A second dimension of the pattern of the Court's citations is the extent to which decisions 
themselves set authoritative precedent, a concept we operationalize in the next section.  While 
some of the Court's opinions are cited relatively infrequently after they appear, others become 
more highly influential, as evidenced by the extent to which they are cited.  With respect to this 
dimension, the internal consistency model would again predict that the variation could be 
explained by the number of cases regarding a particular issue.  Specifically, precedents covering 
issues regarding which the Court hears more cases will be more likely to be cited in the future by 
similar cases.  The strategic legitimation approach offers a less specific prediction regarding this 
dimension.  If the Court cites precedent based on the legal issues in the case, not based on the 
characteristics of the country in question, then legal issues should be the primary determinants of 
the extent to which a case becomes influential.  While it is likely that cases covering certain legal 
issues will be more influential than others, we are not able to provide ex ante predictions in this 
regard.  Finally, the relativist legitimation approach offers a contrasting prediction.  If the Court 
cites precedent based on the type of respondent country, then this should be the primary 
determinant of the extent to which the decision sets authoritative precedent, rather than the legal 
issues. 
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A third dimension of the pattern of the Court's citations is the set of communities within 
the Court's jurisprudence.  Here, the logics of the three approaches outlined above also offer 
competing predictions.  If the Court chooses its citations primarily based on legal issues, then we 
should expect its body of precedent to break down in terms of areas of legal doctrine.  The 
internal consistency and strategic legitimation models share this prediction.  By contrast, if the 
Court cites cases based on the respondent country, then its jurisprudence should break down 
along country-by-country lines or at least be grouped by types of countries, which the relativist 
legitimation model would predict.  Table 1 summarizes the observable implications of these 
three theoretical perspectives. The table separates predictions along the three dimensions 
discussed above.  It should be apparent that the theoretical perspectives are not always mutually 
exclusive, so we are looking for patterns in the data that are more or less consistent with the 
alternative perspectives. 
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Table 1: Observable Implications 
 Internal Consistency Strategic Legitimation Relativist Legitimation 
Purpose of case 
law citations 
To develop an internally 
consistent body of 
precedent. 
To persuade domestic 
parties to implement 
decisions by demonstrating 
impartiality. 
To persuade domestic 
parties to implement 
decisions by demonstrating 
sensitivity to diversity. 
The Authority of Precedent the Court Relies On  
Source of 
variation 
Primarily determined by 
the number of cases on 
that legal issue.   
The more cases on a legal 
issue, the more precedent 
will be cited (H1) 
Primarily determined by the 
legal issues in the case and 
generally not by the 
characteristics of the 
respondent country. 
Physical integrity rights 
cases cite more 
authoritative precedent 
(H2) 
Cases in which a violation 
was found or in which a 
preliminary objection was 
rejected cite more 
authoritative precedent 
(H3) 
Cases involving respondent 
governments from common 
law countries cite more 
authoritative precedent 
(H4) 
Primarily determined by 
the characteristics of the 
respondent country. 
Cases involving 
respondent governments 
from common law 
countries cite more 
authoritative precedent 
(H4) 
 
The Authority of Precedent the Court Sets 
Source of 
variation 
Primarily determined by 
the number of cases on 
that legal issue.   
The more cases on a legal 
issue, the more 
authoritative precedents 
on that issue will be (H5) 
Primarily determined by the 
legal issues in the case and 
not by the characteristics of 
the respondent country.  
Primarily determined by 
the characteristics of 
respondent country. 
Communities of Case Law 
Source of 
variation 
Communities of case law 
are primarily determined  
by legal substance (H6) 
Communities of case law 
are primarily determined  
by legal substance (H6) 
Communities of case law 
are primarily based on 
legal cultural similarities 
(H6a) 
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The ECtHR Citations Network 
Before operationalizing the concepts discussed above, we describe the network of ECtHR 
precedents.  Because our theory relies on the notion that the ECtHR cites precedent in ways that 
resemble domestic review courts, we compare the ECtHR citation network to that of the USSC.   
To illustrate how citations can be analyzed as a network, consider for example a series of 
landmark judgments in the ECtHR’s case law on torture and national security. The ECtHR’s 
judgment in Ireland v. the United Kingdom (1978) established that no derogation is permissible 
from state obligations to refrain from torture even in the event of a security emergency, such as 
the IRA’s terrorist attacks. This principle is referred to in Chahal v. United Kingdom (151996), 
which established a prohibition on extradition of individuals to countries where they may be 
tortured, even if the individuals are suspected terrorists. Both of these cases were cited in Aksoy 
v. Turkey (1996), in which the Court established that when an individual (in this case a suspected 
Kurdish terrorist) is taken into police custody in good health but is found injured on release, the 
burden is on the state to provide a plausible explanation that no torture took place.  All three of 
these cases were cited in the more recent cases of Balyemez v. Turkey (2005) and Ahmet Ozkan 
and Others v. Turkey (2004), both of which addressed cases of Turkish security forces destroying 
Kurdish villages.  The relationships between these cases in the network are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Through 2006, the Court decided 7319 cases, the opinions of which included 35,963 
citations to previous Court decisions.7  Like the citations networks studied by other scholars 
(e.g., Fowler et al. 2007), the Court's citations network includes one main cluster and a large 
number of other cases almost all of which are neither cited by nor cite any other decisions – in 
network analysis terms, these are solitons.8  Following the work of prior citation studies, we 
exclude these cases from our analysis because they are effectively not part of the citations 
network.  Thus, we are left with a main cluster of 6172 cases and 35,962 citations.  An important 
                                                 
7
 This figure includes only judgments on the merits. 
8
 Approximately 15.6% of the ECtHR decisions are outside the main cluster.  By comparison, 16.2% of the 
USSC's decisions are outside the main cluster in that network, and almost all of them are also solitons. 
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institutional difference between the ECtHR and the USSC is case selection. The certiorari system 
allows the USSC to focus its activities on resolving fundamental questions about how the 
Constitution should be interpreted. Instead, the ECtHR must accept all cases that meet 
admissibility criteria. A large number of its cases are straightforward applications of its case-law 
in which no new legal issues arise. These cases appear because the member states have not 
satisfactorily remedies the violations. For example, there are over 1500 nearly identical 
judgments on slow Italian civil court proceedings. We exclude such judgments from our database 
as they provide no information about our questions of interest and would artificially inflate the 
authority of some judgments. Having done so, we are left with a network of 2222 cases and 
16,863 citations.  
Judgments can invoke multiple articles of the Convention.9 The article most frequently 
invoked in judgments is Article 6, with which about half of the decisions in the network are 
concerned. This article provides for the right of access to fair, speedy, and independent courts.  
Article 8 (18%) provides for a broad right to privacy from government authority, subject to 
exceptions such as national security and public safety.  Article 5 (16%) guarantees a right to 
liberty, subject to exceptions such as lawful detention.  Article 13 (13%) provides that national 
authorities must provide an effective remedy to persons whose rights under the Convention have 
been violated, including in cases where those violations were committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity.  The first Article of Protocol 1 (13%) provides a right to the enjoyment of one's 
possessions.  Article 3 (13%) prohibits torture and other inhuman treatment.  Article 14 (11%) 
prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights10 on bases such as gender, race, 
religion and political affiliation.  Article 10 (11%) provides for the freedom of expression, 
subject to exceptions such as national security and public safety.  Finally, Article 2 (5%) 
provides for a general right to life, subject to limited exceptions such as self-defense or lawful 
execution. Turkey has the plurality of cases in the data (14%), followed by France (12%), the 
United Kingdom (11%) and Italy (8%).   
A useful way of summarizing the properties of the ECtHR citations network is by 
examining the distributions of inward citations (i.e., citations to a case) and outward citations 
(i.e., citations from a case), both of which are shown on log-log plots in Figure 2.  Most decisions 
are cited by a small number of cases and, by contrast, few decisions are cited by many cases.  
Similarly, most of the decisions cite a small number of precedents, but a few decisions cite many 
precedents.  This is a common feature in large-scale networks (Albert and Barabási 2002), 
including scientific citation networks (Boerner et al. 2004; Borgatti and Everett 1999).  
Interestingly, the distributions of citations differ from those in the network of USSC citations, 
shown in Figure 3.11  The ECtHR has a smaller share of decisions with very few outward 
                                                 
9
 Data about articles are from Cichowski (2005), which includes cases through 2004. 
10
 This article is only invoked in conjunction with other Convention rights, limiting its application since the 
Convention includes no socio-economic rights other than education. The optional protocol 12 remedies this but is 
ratified by less than half of Council of Europe member states. 
11
 For USSC citations, we use the data provided by Fowler and Jeon 2008. 
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citations as compared to the USSC, which may be the result of a more developed norm of stare 
decisis in the modern era as compared to the early years of the USSC.  The patterns of inward 
citations also differ.  In the ECtHR network, the distribution closely resembles the power-law 
distribution of other complex networks, often referred to as scale-free networks, including the 
World Wide Web (Albert et al. 1999), social networks (Ebel et al. 2002), and even interactions 
between proteins (Jeong et al. 2001). Network theorists argue that this distribution results from a 
process known as "preferential attachment," (Barabási and Albert 1999) which in this context 
suggests that the more often a case has been cited in this past, the higher the probability that it 
will be cited in new cases.  By contrast, the distribution of USSC inward citations is convex, 
deviating significantly from the power-law for cases with fewer citations.  This distribution is 
similar to that of citations between the academic papers cataloged by the Institute for Scientific 
Information (Redner 1998), which covers a broad range of fields.  
We have two theories on why this may be so. First, the USSC hears cases on a broader 
range of issues than the ECtHR.  Thus, the USSC citation network may combine power law 
distributions for several areas of substantive law, resulting in a larger number of cases in the 
middle of the inward citation distribution (and, hence, a convex distribution).  This suggests that 
judicial citation networks covering specific areas of law are subject to preferential attachment 
(like other networks of limited scope), and could also explain why the USSC's distribution is 
more similar to that of a scientific citation network covering many fields (e.g., Redner 1998).  A 
second possible reason may lie in the earlier discussed institutional differences. When the USSC 
resolves a legal issue, preferential attachment may not be operable because at some point case 
law becomes less relevant as it is faithfully applied by lower courts. This is not necessarily so in 
the context of the ECtHR, which has more reason to continue to cite the same cases.  
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Finally, we can use the citations network to analyze the Court's changing reliance on 
precedent.  Figure 4 shows how the average numbers of inward and outward citations changed 
from 1990 to 2006.  The decline in the number of inward citations to cases in recent years is 
likely due to the fact that these cases have been in the network for a relatively short time and, 
therefore, the opportunities for them to be cited have been fewer.  This finding is consistent with 
Fowler and Jeon's (2008) finding for USSC cases.  Of greater interest is the upward trend in the 
number of outward citations.  There appears to be a particular uptick in the number of outward 
citations in 1999, the first year of the post-Protocol XI Court.12 Before the adoption of this 
protocol, states were allowed to exempt themselves from compulsory jurisdiction and direct 
access for private litigants. Protocol XI made both private access and compulsory jurisdiction 
mandatory. Moreover, the Protocol implemented further institutional reforms that made the 
ECHR a full-time court and better insulated the judges. It appears that the creation of a full-time 
court has increased the reliance of judges on precedent, perhaps due to increased professionalism 
or insulation or simply because reliance on general precedent helped the Court deal with its 
increased caseload.  We again compare the ECtHR to the trends in the USSC's citation patterns 
(shown in Figure 5).  Although the two networks have significant size and temporal differences, 
we note that both display an overall growth in outward citations over time and a decrease in 
inward citations to newer cases. 
                                                 
12
 The Protocol went into force on 1 November 1998. 
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Authoritative Precedents in the ECtHR 
In order to test most of the hypotheses provided by the alternative models of citation 
behavior, we analyze the extent to which ECtHR decisions cite important precedents and become 
authoritative precedents by relying on the network concept of centrality.  Decisions that are more 
central are those that are deeply embedded in the network, either because of the extent to which 
they cite other decisions or because they have been cited by other central decisions, and most 
often for both reasons.  By contrast, decisions that are peripheral are not well-connected to other 
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precedents in the network.  Thus, from a substantive perspective, cases that are more central can 
be thought of as being more important or authoritative within the citations network.   
The concepts "important precedent" or "authoritative precedent" are open to multiple 
interpretations. Yet in recent years, scholars of U.S. courts have developed measures of these 
concepts that carry considerable face validity (Fowler et al. 2007; Fowler and Jeon 2008) and 
that can be extended to the ECtHR context.  The measurement procedure relies on network 
analytic methods to identify two kinds of conceptually important opinions, hubs and authorities.  
A hub is an opinion that cites many other decisions, helping to define which legally relevant 
decisions are pertinent to a given precedent. An authority is an opinion that is widely cited by 
other decisions.  Most decisions act as both hubs and authorities, and the degree to which they 
fulfill these roles is mutually reinforcing within the network of cases.  An opinion that is a good 
hub cites many good authorities, and an opinion that is a good authority is cited by many good 
hubs.  Two factors directly affect the hub score of a case: (1) the number of other cases it cites; 
and (2) the authority scores of the cases it cites.  Thus, while it is possible for a case to have a 
high hub score by simply citing many unimportant cases, the cases with the highest hub scores 
are ones that cite many authoritative precedents.   
Fowler and Jeon (2008) calculated hub scores and authority scores for all USSC majority 
opinions through 2002.  They showed that the scores are consistent with expert opinions of the 
most influential cases and they can be used to predict which cases will be identified as important 
in the future.  It should be noted that these scores are dynamic.  For example, the hub score of a 
given opinion may change over time as the cases it cites are cited (or not cited) by other cases 
because that activity causes their authority scores to change.  Similarly, the authority score of a 
case may change as it cited by more cases, especially if those cases have high hub scores.   
Using this method, we have calculated the authority scores and hub scores for ECtHR 
cases through 2006.  While there are no expert rankings of the most important ECtHR decisions 
as there are for the USSC, the Court's own ranking of the importance of cases can be used to 
assess the validity of the authority score measures.  The mean authority score for Level 1 cases is 
24.6, while the mean authority score for Level 2 cases is 6.7, a significant difference at the 99% 
level.  In addition, cases that come to the Court from the Grand Chamber, which are generally 
more important,13 have a mean authority score of 33.4, while other cases have a mean authority 
score of 6.4, a significant difference at the 99% level. 
We can use the hub scores of ECtHR to test Hypotheses 1-4.  If Hypothesis 1 is correct, 
then cases addressing the legal issues that appear most often before the Court should have larger 
hub scores.  A finding that Article 2 and 3 cases have larger hub scores would confirm 
Hypothesis 2.   Hypothesis 3 would be supported by a finding that decisions against governments 
have larger hub scores.  Finally, if Hypothesis 4 is correct, then cases from common law 
countries should have larger hub scores than those from countries with other legal traditions.   
                                                 
13
 The Grand Chamber of seventeen judges takes cases it deems important directly and also reviews some 
decisions by the regular seven-judge Chambers, usually at the request of respondent governments. 
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We focus on the hub scores of cases when they were published (INITIAL HUB SCORE) 
because we want to know how well-grounded in law a decision is at that time (see Lupu & 
Fowler 2010; Cross et al. 2010).  We include several dummy variables indicating the type of 
legal system used in each case's country of origin (LEGAL ORIGIN), using data from La Porta et 
al. (1998).  The base category is the common law system.  The income level of a respondent 
country may be related to the severity of the alleged violation, so we also include a measure of 
the natural log of per-capita GDP of the country of origin during the year in which the case was 
decided, using data from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2009) (LOG PER CAPITA GDP).To 
determine the extent to which the legal substance of a case affects the INITIAL HUB Score, we 
include several dummy variables that indicate whether the decision addressed the provisions of 
the Convention that are invoked most frequently in the network (code "1" if yes and "0" if no).  
Because countries tend to violate (or allegedly violate) the same provisions of the Convention on 
multiple occasions, there is some correlation between the country of origin of the cases in the 
network and the legal substance of those cases.  For example, 112 of the 265 French cases in the 
network includes involve Article 6.  Thus, our research design is intended to untangle this 
correlation in order to determine whether country characteristics or legal substance is more 
important to the ECtHR judges' choices of precedents. 
Several other characteristics of decisions may also affect the extent to which the Court 
cites authoritative precedent.  If the Court relies more heavily on citations to precedent when it 
rules against a government, this should occur in cases in which it finds a government has 
violated the Convention (VIOLATION FOUND) and those in which it rules against a country's 
preliminary objection (PRELIMINARY OBJECTION REJECTED).  Because the Grand Chamber tends 
to take on more salient cases, it may be the case that its decisions will exhibit a greater reliance 
on precedent, so we include an indicator for these cases (GRAND CHAMBER).  As noted above, 
the Court began relying more greatly on citations to precedent after the implementation of 
Protocol XI, so we control for whether the case was decided before or after this event (POST-
PROTOCOL XI). Finally, we note that, by virtue of the algorithm used to calculate them, INITIAL 
HUB SCORES decline over time as more cases enter the network.  Because this decline reflects the 
construction of the network measures rather than a substantive change in the extent to which 
decisions are grounded in precedent, we follow other studies of these measures (Fowler and Jeon 
2008; Lupu & Fowler 2010) in controlling for the year of the decision (YEAR).  Finally, because 
our dependent variable is bound to be positive and has a large number of values clustered at zero 
(i.e., opinions that cite no case precedent), we use Tobit regression (Tobin 1958).  
Model 1 in Table 1 reports our results.  The most important finding here is that several 
areas of legal substance have a significant relationship with INITIAL HUB SCORE, while fewer 
country-specific variables do.  We confirmed this by simulating Model 1 using the Zelig package 
(Imai et al. 2009) and estimating the effect sizes of the key variables on INITIAL HUB SCORE.  As 
Figure 6 shows, the effects of the substantive legal variables on INITIAL HUB SCORE are far 
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greater than those of country-specific factors.14  Because this finding indicates that the extent to 
which a decision cites authoritative precedent depends on its legal substance, rather than its 
origin, the result provides an initial finding that ECtHR judges choose the precedents they cite 
based on the legal substance in the case.   
A second key finding is that those decisions dealing with the most sensitive physical 
integrity rights (Articles 2 and 3) cite significantly more authoritative precedents than other 
decisions, which supports Hypothesis 2.  As we argued above, these difficult cases are the ones 
in which the Court is likely to have the greatest need to justify its decisions.  In addition, several 
other areas of law appear to affect the INITIAL HUB SCORE.  Cases involving Articles 5 (right to 
liberty), 13 (effective remedy) and 14 (discrimination) also result in higher INITIAL HUB SCORE, 
suggesting these are also areas where legitimacy is of great concern to the Court.  These findings 
are not surprising because Article 5 cases also often involve physical integrity rights, whereas 
Articles 13 and 14 are always invoked in conjunction with other Convention articles and often 
accompany controversial Article 2 and 3 cases. Article 13 ensures that victims have a right to an 
effective remedy “notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity.” This article is mostly invoked when human rights violations were committed 
by an agent of the state and hence are inherently politically controversial. Article 14 prohibits 
discrimination but only with respect to the rights guaranteed by the Convention, thus precluding 
suits asserting discrimination for most socio-economic rights unless that discrimination 
(including ill-treatment of minorities) rises to the level of inhumane treatment (Article 3) or even 
right to life (Article 2). More generally, many Article 14 cases involve minority rights issues, 
which are always politically controversial.  
Article 6 (trial rights) and 8 (privacy) cases generally result in lower INITIAL HUB 
SCORES, suggesting that these decisions tend to cite less authoritative precedent, although these 
effects are  relatively small.  A possible reason for this is that these cases lend themselves better 
to a more contextual interpretation that may rely on precedent to a lesser extent.  Another 
possibility is that these areas of law remains in flux and, therefore, the Court does not have a 
consistent set of precedents to follow.  Interestingly, these two articles have the largest numbers 
of cases in the sample.  Thus, this result indicates that the Court does not simply cite more 
authoritative precedent in areas in which it has decided the most cases, Hypothesis 1 predicts,  
based on the internal model.  
Several other case-specific characteristics are significant in this model.  First, when the 
Court finds that a government has violated the Convention, it is more careful to justify its finding 
with reference to prior precedent.  The Court also does so when it rules against the preliminary 
objection of a member-state.  Both of these findings support Hypothesis 3 and, more broadly, the 
notion that ECtHR strategically devote greater resources to those decisions that require more 
legitimation.  Finally, Model 1 confirms that decisions in the Post-Protocol XI era are more well-
grounded in case precedent. 
                                                 
14
 Effect sizes are shown with 95% confidence intervals. 
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Our findings with respect to the relationship between legal culture and INITIAL HUB 
SCORES are mixed.  Because the common law system is the base category, we expected to find 
negative and significant coefficients with respect to all categories.  Based on our results, we can 
conclude the Court is more careful when ruling on cases from common law countries to ground 
its decisions in case precedent than it is when ruling on cases from countries whose legal systems 
derive from the French, Scandinavian and (with a lower degree of certainty) German traditions.  
With respect to former Socialist countries, however, we find no significant difference from 
common law countries.  This suggests that perhaps the Court is particularly careful to ground its 
opinions in case precedent when addressing Courts from states that have joined the Convention 
more recently and, therefore, may require more convincing.  On the whole, these results provide 
some support for Hypothesis 4, but are not conclusive.  
Finally, as we expected, YEAR has a negative, significant effect on INITIAL HUB SCORE by 
virtue of the methodology used to construct the measure.  These results are robust to the 
inclusion of an indicator of domestic human rights observance: political terror scores based on 
Amnesty International reports (Gibney 2003). 
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We continue this analysis by examining whether there are any systematic factors that 
determine whether a case becomes more or less authoritative (i.e., more important as future 
precedent).  We use as our dependent variable a decision's authority score as of 2006 
(AUTHORITY SCORE).  As above, we include LEGAL ORIGIN and LOG PER CAPITA GDP as key 
country characteristics.  If precedent against wealthier countries is used to motivate decisions, 
then we may expect that the authority of a case increased with the LOG PER CAPITA GDP of the 
country of origin during the year in which the case was decided.  In addition, if the Court tends 
to cite previous decisions regarding the country of origin of the case in question, then the cases 
from countries with more cases in the network would have higher AUTHORITY SCORES.  To test 
for this, we include a measure of the number of cases in the network from the respondent country 
(NUMBER OF COUNTRY CASES).  We include the legal substance variables to test whether or not 
they affect AUTHORITY SCORES independently from country characteristics.  Because cases 
decided by the Grand Chamber may be more influential, we also control for this factor.  Finally, 
we control for the year because AUTHORITY SCORES decline over time by design. 
Several interesting findings emerge from Model 2, shown in Table 2.  Most importantly, 
legal substance is a much more significant determinant of AUTHORITY SCORE than country 
characteristics.  In fact, the only country characteristics that are significant in this model are 
NUMBER OF COUNTRY CASES and LOG PER CAPITA GDP, yet a simple comparison of their 
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coefficient to those of the significant legal substance variables suggests they have relatively 
small effects on AUTHORITY SCORE.  We confirmed this by simulating Model 2 using Zelig and 
estimating the effect sizes of the key variables on AUTHORITY SCORE.  As Figure 7 shows, the 
effects of the substantive legal variables on AUTHORITY SCORE are far greater than those of 
country characteristics.15  Because this finding indicates that the importance of a case within the 
network depends on its legal substance, rather than its origin, the result builds our findings in the 
INITIAL HUB SCORE analysis that ECtHR judges choose the precedents they cite based on the 
legal substance in the case.   
Secondly, it is important to note that only certain areas of legal substance have a 
significant effect on AUTHORITY SCORE—specifically, Articles 2, 3 and 5.  While several Turkish 
cases have high AUTHORITY SCORES, the regression results indicate that this occurs not because 
Turkey has the most cases in the network (304 cases), but because most of its cases address 
Article 2 (115 cases), Article 3 (91 cases), and/or Article 5 (45 cases).  By contrast, while Article 
6, for example, is invoked in the most cases, this does not have a significant effect on the 
importance of Article 6 cases generally.  That is a particularly intriguing result because, by sheer 
volume, we might have expected that these cases would have generated enough citations to have 
an impact on their AUTHORITY SCORES, as Hypothesis 5 predicts based on the internal model.  
One reason for this finding is that Article 6 cases are spread throughout the network, which in 
substantive terms means they tend to be cited by many different types of cases.  This seems 
especially likely because procedural trial rights issues tend to come up in cases involving 
different types of substantive violations.  Just as importantly, the lack of a significant relationship 
between Article 6 cases and AUTHORITY SCORES indicates that the importance of cases as 
precedent is not simply determined by the number of similar cases in the network.  
                                                 
15
 Effect sizes are shown with 95% confidence intervals.  The effect sizes for LOG PER CAPITA GDP and 
NUMBER OF COUNTRY CASES are for one-standard-deviation increases in these variables. 
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Thus far, our analysis supports the strategic legitimation model of the use citations to 
precedent by the ECtHR in four ways.  First, national characteristics of respondent governments 
do not explain why some decisions cite more authoritative precedents than others, nor why some 
cases become more or less authoritative.  This is a key indication that the Court chooses the 
precedents it cites based on the legal issues in the case, regardless of where those cases 
originated.  The one exception to this is that cases against respondent governments with common 
law origins appear to be better grounded in case law than cases originating in states with certain 
other legal traditions, perhaps because common law courts are more used to this practice. 
However, cases against common law countries do not become more or less authoritative. 
Second, the most politically sensitive cases (Articles 2 and 3) are the best grounded in 
authoritative precedent.  Third, cases involving physical integrity rights (Articles 2 and 3) tend to 
set more authoritative precedent—they are cited often, and by well-grounded decisions.  Because 
Article 2 and 3 cases tend to be both more authoritative as precedent and cite more authoritative 
precedent, we have an indication that these cases tend to cite each other regularly, making this a 
distinct area of law within the Court's jurisprudence.  To determine whether this is the case, we 
next analyze the community structure of the ECtHR citations network.  Fourth, our results 
indicate that the Court is most careful to ground its decisions in authoritative precedent when 
domestic courts need the most convincing, i.e., in cases in which the Court rules against the 
respondent country.  
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Communities in the ECtHR Precedent Network 
To test Hypothesis 6 against Hypothesis 6a, we rely on the notion that networks can be 
divided into communities. Recently, several scholars have found communities in legislative 
networks based on studies of committee membership (Porter et al. 2005), roll-call voting (Waugh 
et al. 2009) and bill co-sponsorship (Zhang et al. 2008) in the U.S. House of Representatives.  
Here we ask whether different communities exist within ECtHR jurisprudence and, if so, 
whether membership in these communities defined by the legal substance of cases or by national 
characteristics of respondent governments.  If the ECtHR cites precedents in a manner analogous 
to a constitutional review court, choosing precedents based on legal substance, then we would 
expect the communities of its jurisprudence to reflect different areas of substantive law.    
Consistent with the network analysis literature, we define a community as a group of 
cases that cites each other more often than they cite cases outside the community (Porter et al. 
2009; Costa et al. 2006; Newman 2004).  The method we used to detect the community structure 
of the network is designed to maximize the extent to which cases placed in a given community 
cite each other and minimize citations between cases in different communities.  In network 
analysis, this is often referred to as the modularity of a network partition, which is an indication 
of how well it separates the communities from each other (Newman 2006).16   
The method we use was described by Newman (2004) and starts with a state in which 
each decision is a member of n communities.  It then joins these communities in pairs, choosing 
the pairs that result in the greatest increase or smallest decrease in modularity.  The algorithm 
continues to join communities into pairs until it finds the combination with the highest 
modularity.  At this point, the algorithm assigns an arbitrary community identifier to each case.  
In the only other paper we are aware of that used community detection algorithms on a network 
of judicial citations, Bommarito et al. (2010) found that the Newman (2004) method produced 
stable results when used on the network of USSC citations.  They also found that this stability 
increased when using a smaller portion of the network, which is encouraging to our research 
because the ECtHR network is significantly smaller than the USSC network. 
The Newman method detects seven communities in the network of ECtHR citations.  The 
first four communities contain 226, 792, 860 and 313 cases, respectively.  Because communities 
5 (21 cases), 6 (5 cases), and 7 (5 cases) contain so few cases, it is unlikely that we can gain any 
meaningful insight from them into the structure of the citations network, so we exclude them 
from the remainder of our analysis.  We are thus left with four main communities.   
 A finding that supports Hypothesis 6 would be that these communities are defined along 
areas of legal doctrine.  By contrast, Hypothesis 6a, based on the relativist legitimation model, 
predicts that the communities would be defined based on country characteristics such as legal 
culture or income.  Figures 8 and 9 help clarify the substantive interpretation of these 
                                                 
16
 Because this type of algorithm can be sensitive to implementation details, we note that we used the 
software package igraph, version 0.54 (Csardi and Nepusz 2006), in the R programming language.  
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communities by respectively showing the percentage of cases within each community that refer 
to a specific article and the most common keywords for cases within that community. 
Community 1 is composed primarily of cases that address the most serious personal integrity 
rights violations, including government actions or negligence that results in loss of life (Article 
2) or inhumane treatment (Article 3).  Article 8 (privacy) and 13 (effective remedy) violations 
are often invoked in conjunction with those violations. Article 6 (right to a free and fair trial) is 
the most commonly invoked provision in both communities 2 and 3. The cases in community 2 
primarily concern rights of criminal defendants and prisoner rights (e.g., Article 5).  By contrast, 
the cases in community 3 primarily concern civil proceedings, such as property rights cases (P1-
1).  Finally, Community 4 mostly contains cases that address freedom of expression and possible 
exceptions to that—strikingly, the top 4 keywords in this community all pertain to Article 10 
issues.  These are civil and political rights issues that do not directly relate to the functioning of 
the judicial systems but rather to the limits of government interference into social and political 
life. 
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These findings suggest that membership in communities is determined by the legal 
substance of cases. Of course, because of the correlation between countries of origin and the 
legal substance of cases, we must perform additional analysis to understand the community 
structure.  Because the Newman algorithm returns the communities with exclusive categorical 
indicators, we used multinomial logistic regression to estimate a model using similar variables to 
our analysis of centrality. 17  Model 3 in Table 3 includes both country-of-origin characteristics 
and legal substance indicators. Community 4 is the baseline.   
In general, Model 3 demonstrates that the legal substance is more important than the 
origin of the case in terms of determining the community structure, which supports Hypothesis 6. 
One exception to that seems to be that cases from countries with a common law system are more 
likely to be in Community 2 than in Community 3, while the reverse is true for former Socialist 
states and those with French or Scandinavian legal systems.  A plausible explanation for this is 
that civil court systems in common law systems tend to be less formalist and more efficient than 
in systems of other legal origins (Djankov et al. 2003), thus leading to fewer complaints about 
civil proceedings. Moreover, cases from wealthier states are more likely to be in Community 3 
relative to the other communities. These findings can perhaps be attributed to the notion that 
human rights violations in wealthier countries are less likely to be as severe and that Community 
3 in general contains less severe human rights violations. 
                                                 
17
 Here, we do not include controls for the year in which a decision was issued nor for the number of cases 
from a country because we have no reason to believe these affect the community structure.   
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Overall, however, the communities in the ECtHR citations are based on areas of legal 
doctrine.  The regression results confirm the analysis above regarding the meanings of these 
communities.  Cases involving Articles 2, 3 and 5, all of which concern physical integrity rights, 
tend to be in Community 1.  While Article 3 and 5 cases are also often in Community 2, we 
know from the keyword analysis above that these tend to be cases where procedural rights were 
violated, rather than cases where a life was taken unlawfully, as is the case for Community 1.  
Community 3 contains cases addressing various areas of civil proceedings, including Article 8 
(privacy), Article 14 (discrimination) and Protocol 1 Article 1 (property rights), tend to be in 
Community 3.  Finally, Community 4, as we discussed above, appears to primarily include 
freedom-of-expression cases (Article 10), which we know based on the negative, significant 
coefficients on Article 10 in all the other communities. Interestingly, Article 6 are less likely to 
be in community 4 than all other communities, which indicates that trial rights issues are less 
likely to be raised in conjunction with freedom of expression issues than they are with other 
grievances. 
28 
 
 
Conclusions 
As we noted above, the predictions made by the three competing approaches regarding 
the purpose of citations are not mutually exclusive.  Nonetheless, our analysis finds strong 
29 
 
support for our argument that ECtHR judges cite precedent in order to provide strategic 
legitimation for their decisions.  Our results provide strong support for Hypotheses 2, 3, and 6 as 
well as mixed support for Hypothesis 4, all of which are consistent with the strategic legitimation 
model.  By contrast, we find little support for Hypotheses 1, 5 and 6a, all of which are derived 
from the competing approaches.  
Our findings are also consistent with the perspective that the ECtHR by and large uses 
case law to justify its decisions in a way that is similar to domestic constitutional courts. Choices 
to refer to specific precedents are not systemically influenced by the characteristics of the 
countries involved but by the legal principles invoked in those earlier cases. This does not mean 
the Court’s justifications are not motivated by politics. Instead, it suggests that the political 
considerations that enter into citation choices are not fundamentally different than those faced by 
domestic review courts. For example, we find that like domestic review courts, the ECtHR exerts 
more effort to embed its judgments in case law when the judgment is more sensitive politically. 
We suggest that this may be because the Court wishes to persuade domestic courts to implement 
the legal principles it develops and that the cost for domestic courts to do so are higher for 
politically sensitive cases. This conclusion is consistent with earlier findings that ECtHR judges 
are politically motivated in the sense that they wish to see the law reflect their preferences (as do 
domestic judges) not in the sense that they use judgments to settle geopolitical scores or 
otherwise reflect national interests or culture (Voeten 2008). Moreover, it fits with the 
observation that the ECtHR’s internal culture is generally homogenous despite the various legal 
cultures represented on the bench (Arold 2007). 
This analysis by no means definitively resolves the debate on whether supranational 
adjudication is becoming comparably effective to domestic adjudication (e.g., Helfer and 
Slaughter 1997). The ECtHR is among the more advanced international courts, so these 
conclusions may not apply elsewhere. Moreover, even if ECtHR judges use similar 
methodologies and techniques as domestic review judges, it may well be that their decisions do 
not have similar effects. This aspect is beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, we have only 
investigated whether the inclusion of case law is consistent across cases, not whether case law 
principles are applied consistently. Such a study would require more legal interpretation than we 
are equipped to provide. Yet, the absence of any systematic influence of country-specific factors 
on the citations of case law on an international court as heterogeneous as the ECtHR is telling 
about the potential of international law to supersede national divides. 
As far as we know, this is the first social-scientific empirical analysis of the use and 
development of precedent on any international court. There is an increasing recognition among 
legal scholars and political scientists that the ability of international courts to develop legal 
norms is important not just because it creates de facto new legal obligations (Helfer 2008) but 
also because it shapes strategic choices of states, such as decisions where to file disputes (Busch 
2007). In order to advance this study, we need a better understanding not just of how courts 
develop precedent but also how to measure attributes of precedent, such as its relative authority 
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or centrality. In accord with recent developments in the study of domestic courts, we argue that 
network analysis is the most appropriate tool for providing such measures.  
In addition, ours is among the most comprehensive analyses of judicial citation networks.  
As a result, we have produced both methodological and substantive findings that should be of 
interest to a range of scholars.  First, we have learned that, despite its short history, the changes 
in citation patterns in the ECtHR are similar to those at the USSC, which suggests the ECtHR 
develops precedent in a way that parallels certain domestic courts.  Second, by comparing the 
distributions of citations by these two courts, we have found evidence that certain types of 
judicial citation networks are scale-free, the substantive implication of which is that preferential 
attachment plays a role in the development of legal precedent.  We hope scholars interested in 
comparative legal institutions will investigate this point in further detail.  Third, by conducting 
the first analysis of the substantive meanings of case communities within a network of judicial 
citations, we have provided a framework for scholars interested in doing so with respect to other 
courts.  
Our analysis opens up several fruitful avenues of future research.  First, there are further 
possibilities to study the development of precedent within the ECtHR, such as how the 
introduction of Eastern European countries affected the network structure of citations. Second, 
our study opens up opportunities to study the link between the ECtHR and other courts, 
including domestic courts within the Council of Europe, other international courts that regularly 
cite the ECtHR (especially the Inter-American Court of Human Rights), and even U.S. courts, 
which cite the ECtHR more frequently than any other foreign court in cases where they use 
foreign decisions to interpret U.S. law (Zaring 2006).  Finally, given its uncertain compliance 
environment, the ECtHR provides an ideal setting for testing whether the quality of legal 
reasoning affects compliance with court decisions.   
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